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Abstract 
Based on a critical account of the dominant con-
cept of theory, the paper presents an alternative, 
wider notion of theory. It is motivated by the need to 
cope with a contingent research subject and the as-
sumption that IS should provide an orientation for 
managing the digital transformation. Unlike neo-
positivistic notions of theory, the proposed concep-
tion is not restricted to descriptions of the factual, but 
may be aimed at designing possible future worlds. 
Conceiving of possible future worlds requires over-
coming the barriers created by language that consti-
tutes our idea of the present world. The paper dis-
cusses the resulting methodological challenges and 
outlines how they might be addressed. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
There is a phenomenal accomplishment, an out-
standing document of human cognition, a source of 
inspiration, a rich reference to make sense of the 
world we live in, a powerful idea to structure our 
thoughts and to give us confidence. I am speaking 
about the concept of theory which is at the core of 
modern science. There are numerous examples of 
theories that have a substantial impact on everyday 
life; some of which we might not even be aware of, 
even though we depend on them. Others serve us as 
an explicit and ultimate model to explain unobvious 
occurrences and to reduce our uncertainty about the 
consequences of natural events and human action. 
While the benefits of theories in the natural sciences 
are widely agreed upon, there are serious concerns 
over the concept of theory: “If any problem in the 
philosophy of science justifiably can be claimed the 
most central or important, it is that of the nature and 
structure of scientific theories …” ([1], p. 3). First, 
there is the problem of defining a concept of theory 
that permits a clear distinction of theories and other 
knowledge offerings. There are various properties 
that are often regarded as necessary, for example, the 
falsifiability postulate. However, those constraints are 
not sufficient for an unambiguous demarcation, since 
they do not, for example, permit a convincing answer 
to the question of whether a construction proposed as 
a theory cannot be reduced to a more general con-
struction. Other concerns relate to the concept of 
causality as it is inherent to a widespread understand-
ing of theory and reflected in the Hempel-Oppenheim 
schema [2]. The preferred, if not the only accepted, 
way to represent theories in the natural sciences is to 
formalize them. In the ideal case, a theory is a model 
(an interpretation) of an axiomatic system. Hence, the 
precision or objectivity of a theory is mainly chal-
lenged by the question of how terms that are intro-
duced by a theory relate to terms of a theory-
independent observation language [3]. As a conse-
quence, sophisticated concepts of theory were pro-
posed to avoid or mitigate this problem, such as the 
“semantic” [4] or the “non-statement” view [5]. 
However, despite its intensity, the debate in phi-
losophy of science hardly unsettled natural scientists. 
Independent of the lack of a precise definition, the 
idea of a theory seems to work and brings exciting 
results. The situation is clearly different in the social 
sciences in general, and in IS in particular. While 
neo-positivistic research methods are predominant, 
there are serious concerns over the adequacy of this 
paradigm for the social sciences. The concerns, 
which are related to principal ontological and episte-
mological presuppositions (see, e.g., [6], [7]), include 
challenging the role of theory. Avison and Malaurent 
complain about the reference to theories being re-
garded as an obligatory property of a contribution to 
qualify as academic (“theory fetish”, [8]). Various 
other authors regard focusing on theories or, more 
likely on theory testing, in IS as an inhibitor of inspir-
ing research results. Some doubt that the theories 
used in IS are of any value for decision makers in 
practice, a topic of intense controversy in the notori-
ous “rigor versus relevance” debate [9], [10]. 
In this paper, I will first argue that the compulsive 
use of an inappropriate idea of theory contributes to 
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the parlous state of the field. Then I will propose a 
notion of theory that accounts for the peculiarities of 
IS. It combines (semi-) formal conceptual models 
with thought provoking narratives. With respect to 
justification, it suggests supplementing truth with 
grounded hope. 
 
2. Theories in IS: Signs of (Mis-) Concep-
tion 
 
It seems that the debate on research methods in 
general, and the use of theories in particular, is not 
more than background noise to the ongoing reproduc-
tion of what is taken as common wisdom by many: 
that scientific research “should be based on a set of 
well-defined hypotheses, unbiased and reproducible 
procedures for collecting evidence that supports or 
refutes the hypothesis, and sound analytical proce-
dures for drawing appropriate conclusions from the 
evidence.” (MISQ, Sept. 1989, editorial statement). 
Nevertheless, I am naive enough to launch a further 
attempt to challenge the dominant model of research 
in IS. 
 
2.1. Inconsistencies 
 
The quest for a theoretical foundation is top of the 
list reviewers use to assess papers. However, not only 
are there are “conflicting notions of theory” [11], but 
also a lack of definitions that could clearly distin-
guish theories from other knowledge offerings. Even 
though this may be seen as an unavoidable reflection 
of the complexity of the subject, it indicates a ques-
tionable lack of consistency in the foundation of a 
discipline that regards the quest for rigor as one of its 
cornerstones. 
The dominant conception of theory in IS seems to 
correspond to the behaviorist model, which, for the 
sake of simplicity, I will refer to as neo-positivistic. It 
is characterized by adopting ideas from logical posi-
tivism, such as the Hempel-Oppenheim schema, and 
by following Popper in respect of the belief that test-
ing theories by confronting hypotheses deduced from 
them with reality is a key element of scientific in-
quiry. However, in contrast to Popper’s demands, the 
information content of models of theories tested in IS 
is often systematically reduced, sometimes close to 
tautology, to avoid immediate refutation. This does 
not come as a surprise, since there are no theories that 
would satisfy the standards of theories in the natural 
sciences. Furthermore, theory testing is not aimed at 
refutation in the strict sense that Popper had in mind. 
Instead, testing is usually aimed at applying statistical 
procedures to calculate confidence levels. The fact 
that Popper regarded assigning probabilities to prop-
ositions as unscientific does not necessarily disquali-
fy this approach. However, it is odd that this conflict 
is usually ignored and that, in general, the epistemo-
logical relevance of statistical procedures remains 
undisputed. 
 
2.2. Contingency and Change 
 
Theories used in IS lack one essential property of 
impressive theories in the natural sciences. They do 
not allow for prediction. In part driven by this fact, 
there has been an intensive debate in the social sci-
ences and in philosophy of science whether or not it 
is appropriate to apply the same model of research 
and, hence, the same concept of theory to both the 
natural sciences and the social sciences. I will not go 
into the details of this debate, but look at one com-
mon argument used by neo-positivists to justify be-
haviorist methods. That argument holds the lack of 
powerful theories does not indicate the principal 
unsuitability of the behaviorist model for the social 
sciences, because it is only a matter of time until we 
see more powerful theories. While the first part of the 
argument cannot be invalidated for logical reasons, 
the second can be challenged—and I think it should 
be challenged because of its potentially harmful ef-
fects. Among a plethora of counter-arguments I will 
focus on three that are of special relevance for our 
field. The first argument is an ontological one and 
reflects the assumption that action systems are char-
acterized by contingency: actions may follow certain 
patterns, but they do not have to. Our experience in 
everyday life as well as numerous studies in sociolo-
gy and social psychology confirm this assumption. 
The second argument is based on a common idea 
of man that is also shared by neo-positivists like 
Popper. According to this idea, human beings have 
free will. If we refuse to abandon this comforting 
idea, theories with the predictive power of those in 
the natural sciences are not conceivable in the social 
sciences: everyone can decide to follow the pattern 
described in a theory or not. The third and strongest 
argument focuses on a phenomenon that is at the core 
of our research subject: change and the role of lan-
guage. While we do not yet know the details of the 
digital transformation, there are good reasons to as-
sume that it will fundamentally change the way we 
work, live, and think. Therefore, it seems a core re-
sponsibility of a discipline that is supposed to study 
the use of digital technologies in organizations to 
develop insights and guidelines that help benefit from 
the forthcoming change instead of suffering from it. 
Putting aside the question how that could be 
achieved, it is obvious that the neo-positivistic para-
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digm is not suited to coping with this challenge. This 
is for two interrelated reasons. First, behaviorist re-
search is restricted to studying the present or, more 
likely, the past. According to that doctrine, theories 
that were successfully tested in the past could be used 
to forecast the future or, at least provide guidance for 
planning the future. However, lessons learned in the 
past are only of limited use for creating the future in 
an era of disruptive change. They may teach us what 
we do not want, but are insufficient to show us what 
future we can aim for. Second, the world as we per-
ceive it, depends on the language we speak, in other 
words: “…there is no other kind of cognition than 
through concepts.” ([12], p. 202). Therefore, we can 
think of the world and especially of social systems as 
being constructed through language [13] and speech 
acts [14]. Hence, social, economic and technical 
change is always accompanied by changing the rele-
vant language. At the same time, software systems 
are linguistic constructions, too. Therefore, the con-
struction of information systems will have an impact 
on the language their users speak and subsequently, 
those altered language games will have an impact on 
the design of future software systems. This subtle 
pattern of mutually re-enforcing change has been 
known for some time, and it has a tremendous impact 
on the research that is required to provide guidance 
for the digital transformation. If the modification of 
language is an essential characteristic of this trans-
formation, we need to address the question of how 
the language we speak and the language we use to 
build information systems should be altered to pre-
pare for a better future. This corresponds to Rorty’s 
pragmatic view of language: “Philosophers have long 
wanted to understand concepts, but the point is to 
change them so as to make them serve our purposes 
better.” ([15], p. 25). If IS takes the challenge of the 
digital transformation seriously, it can neither neglect 
the essential role of language (both of natural lan-
guages and implementation languages) nor the need 
to analyze how languages should look to sow the 
seeds of a better future. Here, the neo-positivist para-
digm hits its limits. First, the idea of formulating 
“objective” theories would be shattered, because 
theories as linguistic constructions would always 
reflect the reality or ontological practices ([6], p. 7) 
of a certain time frame. Second, developing new 
concepts to foster better information systems and in 
general, a more desirable world, would make the 
correspondence theory of truth and, hence, empirical 
testing procedures widely redundant: the new con-
cepts and action systems they refer to are deliberately 
made different from the current reality. Design Sci-
ence [16], which has achieved a modest popularity in 
recent years, does not provide a convincing founda-
tion for this kind of research. Its core assumptions are 
positivistic (design objectives and design theories 
should be grounded empirically) and the idea of con-
struction it promotes reflects a mechanistic 
worldview (searching for solutions in a design space) 
(for a more detailed critique of Design Science see 
[17]). 
 
3. A Multifaceted Conception of Theory 
 
Thus far, our considerations have resulted in two 
main insights: First, the neo-positivistic idea of theo-
ry is not suited as a leading paradigm of research in 
IS. Second, there is need for a conception of theory 
that accounts for the peculiarities of our research 
subject, in particular for the role language plays in 
the digital transformation. 
 
3.1. Theories as Multiple Constructions 
 
The conception of theory that I will briefly intro-
duce now is based on two assumptions: First, it is not 
possible to define a concept of theory that would 
allow for an unambiguous distinction of theories 
from other knowledge contributions. However, that 
does not mean to give up on this distinction, because 
that meant to abandon the claim for the superiority of 
scientifically approved knowledge. Therefore, criteria 
are required that support making a corresponding 
decision. Second, theories cannot be appropriately 
conceptualized, if they are reduced to mere linguistic 
constructions. Against this background I propose that 
any knowledge offering qualifies as theory as long as 
it satisfactorily fulfills essential epistemological pos-
tulates with respect to a certain methodological and 
cultural context (for a more detailed discussion see 
[17]). Three epistemological postulates seem to be 
pivotal: abstraction, originality, and justification. 
According to the neo-positivistic notion of theory, 
abstraction may reflect the classification of objects 
found in the factual world. I suggest extending the 
scope of abstraction by intentionally going beyond 
the factual to target possible future worlds. This is 
not an entirely new facet of theory, but is in line with 
the original meaning of the Greek “Θεωρία”, which 
literally means “outlook” in the sense of looking 
beyond the obvious. At the same time, it is similar to 
studies on the future [18], [19], but different from 
those with respect to focusing on the construction of 
possible futures. From a more philosophical perspec-
tive, this suggests also aiming for detachment and 
transcendence. In other words, a theory should reflect 
a picture of what we could see, if we overcame the 
restrictions of our physical, social, and political exist-
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ence; and, hence, of our language. Developing possi-
ble future worlds must not be mistaken for science 
fiction. It makes sense only if it satisfies certain de-
mands related to justification (see 4.3). 
Originality comprises two essential aspects. Orig-
inal knowledge should be new, that is, not yet known, 
and it should satisfy the superiority postulate, which 
means it should in some respect be superior to exist-
ing knowledge. In other words, it should be capable 
of surprising those peers who work in the same field. 
This could also be achieved by shattering accepted 
knowledge. Since justification creates a particular 
challenge especially with respect to the construction 
of possible future worlds, we shall look at this issue 
in more detail in 4.3. 
The epistemological quality of a knowledge offer-
ing also depends on its documentation: any idea qual-
ifies as theory only if it is externalized in a way that 
supports its evaluation and use. In other words, for 
theories to exist they need to be mediated in a way 
that makes sense. Among other aspects, documenta-
tion implies the use of an elaborate, precise language. 
Last, but not least, enacting or effectively construct-
ing a theory requires a conception of a scientific 
community, which is characterized through a com-
mitment to a certain culture and a range of accepted 
methodological practices (see 4). This context is 
essential for deciding whether or not the epistemolog-
ical postulates are satisfied. In the remaining part of 
this section, we will look at two kinds of knowledge 
contributions that are of specific relevance for the 
design of possible future worlds, where advanced 
information systems are supposed to play a pivotal 
role. 
 
3.2. Conceptual Models 
 
Models have always been at the core of scientific 
inquiry. They serve to describe the subject of investi-
gation in a way that enables further analysis, and 
allows for comparison and transformation. Further-
more, they provide a medium for communication, 
and moreover, models are the only instrument availa-
ble to develop an idea of the future. Using the meta-
phor of a map, Wood expresses the pivotal role of 
models for our cognition clearly: “And this, essential-
ly, is what maps give us, reality, a reality that exceeds 
our vision, our reach, the span of our days, a reality 
we achieve no other way.” ([20], p. 4 ff.). 
While models are essential for imagining the fu-
ture in general, a specific kind of model is of particu-
lar relevance to the digital transformation. Software 
will have an ever increasing impact on shaping future 
worlds. For the (re-) use of software systems, for 
integrating software systems and for adapting them, 
the underlying conceptual models are highly relevant. 
Conceptual models are aimed at bridging the gap 
between the natural language in the relevant domains 
of discourse and the implementation language of 
choice, which, in most cases, will be an object-
oriented programming language. The bridging func-
tion is achieved by using foundational/ontological 
concepts for modeling languages that are used in both 
natural language and implementation languages, such 
as class, object, and attribute. A conceptual model 
that serves this purpose cannot be described with 
natural language, because natural language is vague 
and ambiguous. In addition, preparing for automation 
may require the modification of concepts, such as the 
concept of a document. Finally, the design of soft-
ware systems will often be aimed at flexibility, inte-
gration and reuse. That requires powerful abstractions 
which in turn may suggest the introduction of con-
cepts which do not have a direct counterpart in natu-
ral language. Hence, conceptual models are recon-
structions of concepts found in natural language 
domains. These reconstructions are created with 
modeling languages; either a general purpose model-
ing language (GPML) like the UML or a domain-
specific modeling language (DMSL). 
Developing conceptual models that can serve as 
foundation for a range of present and future software 
systems poses a considerable research challenge. 
How are they related to theories? Conceptual models 
may satisfy the abstraction postulate, if they are not 
restricted to a particular organization, but come with 
the claim to cover a wider range of use cases, as 
intended with reference models. They may also ac-
count for originality, if the systems they enable pro-
vide important, non-trivial features that were not 
known of before. Unlike the positivistic notion of 
theory, conceptual models do not necessarily aim to 
represent factual domains. They may also serve to 
create an image of a possible future domain, or, in 
other words: to propose a language to conceive of 
this future domain. Such a language may look more 
or less familiar to prospective users, depending on 
how radical the intended change is supposed to be. 
Also, they serve as a foundation for corresponding 
software systems. For this purpose, there should be 
transformation rules that define how to map the con-
cepts of a modeling language to those used in the 
targeted domain. Research on conceptual models 
does not only comprise the construction of models, 
but also the design of new modeling languages that 
provide more powerful abstractions or that are better 
tuned to the requirements of specific domains. 
By focusing on conceptual models and modeling 
languages, IS research goes beyond contributing 
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directly to the design of possible future information 
systems. Conceptual models also serve to illustrate 
possible future action systems. The ever increasing 
penetration of information systems into organizations 
advances the case for models that integrate action 
systems with information systems through the use of 
common concepts. This would be similar to what is 
already done in the field of enterprise modeling [21]. 
However, it would be clearly more radical in the 
sense that it would target delivering models that 
overcome the artificial border between the language 
games of IT and of the business. 
 
3.3. Narratives 
 
While conceptual models can serve as a powerful 
foundation for creating possible future worlds, they 
are not sufficient. To assess a possible world, people 
need to be able to imagine how it would be to live in 
that world or, in other words, what sense such a 
world would make. While conceptual models are 
clearly better suited to serve this purpose than math-
ematical models or code fragments, they intentionally 
fade out all aspects of the intended use context that 
bulk against formalization, such as symbolic action, 
informal communication, and power games. This can 
be supported by narratives of a possible future. 
Those narratives would aim at rich descriptions of 
certain aspects of life in a future world. They could 
be related to illustrate new practices enabled by new 
technologies. Narratives might supplement conceptu-
al models or stand on their own. 
While I agree with Rorty that good novels and 
films can tell us more about life than mediocre sci-
ence, I would not support his idea of a “general turn 
against theory and toward narrative” ([22], p. xvi), 
and I would not want to abandon the epistemological 
postulates outlined above. I prefer to think of scientif-
ically grounded narratives, which have similarities to 
hermeneutic conceptions of theory. They also resem-
ble the concept of the theory of situated practice 
proposed by Hovorka et al. who stress the use of 
narratives to foster “comprehending the world” by 
providing access to “the background of the worlds in 
which people conduct their day-to-day practices.” 
([23], p. 16) However, the scientifically grounded 
narrative concept can differ from those conceptions 
in that it does not primarily aim to contribute to un-
derstanding the factual world (even though that 
should be a side effect), but to comprehend possible 
future worlds. That implies that the hermeneutic 
demand to get involved cannot be satisfied directly, 
because the practices that would make it possible to 
do so do not exist. Nevertheless, that would not mean 
to give up the demand for comprehension and empa-
thy ([24], p. 20) nor for sense-making [25]. Such a 
narrative should present a differentiated picture that 
includes possible conflicts, inconsistencies and 
threats. In addition, it should of course be made clear 
that narratives of this kind address a contingent mat-
ter: the future they describe should be possible, but 
that neither means that it will become reality, nor that 
there is a deterministic way to achieve it. 
 
4. Methodological Considerations 
 
If research wishes to develop ideas of possible 
worlds that may serve as an orientation for change, 
traditional research methods, which are mainly fo-
cused on empirical evidence or on existing phenome-
na, are not sufficient. Below I will first present two 
facets of a corresponding research method, before 
examining approaches to justification. 
 
4.1. The Role of Contradictions 
 
Apart from the essential question of how we want 
to live and work tomorrow, the design of possible 
future worlds is also guided by goals that, while 
largely undisputed, are hard to achieve. To give a few 
examples: Information systems should be integrated 
with the action systems they are supposed to support. 
Software artifacts should be reusable to reduce de-
velopment costs and improve quality simultaneously. 
Software systems should feature a high level of integ-
rity of the data they manage. Software systems 
should be adaptable without jeopardizing a system’s 
integrity. Organizational rules should be clearly de-
fined to ensure the reliability of the services offered 
to customers. Organizations should be flexible to 
cope with external threads and opportunities. 
While each of these demands seems suited to 
serve as an orientation for improving the factual 
world, a closer look at the measures required to 
achieve them reveals that some are in conflict or even 
contradictory. To take a closer look at one example 
only: the idea of integrity, both with respect to action 
systems and to software systems, demands the exist-
ence of a comprehensive schema that can be referred 
to whenever an activity needs to be performed. Flexi-
bility on the other hand requires systems to be able to 
cope with changing requirements. Therefore, in clear 
contradiction to the demand for integrity, the quest 
for flexibility would require the introduction of less 
restrictive constraints that allow for a range of differ-
ent interpretations. 
Contradictions of this kind are well known. They 
are either treated as trade-offs or intentionally ig-
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nored by design guidelines such as loose coupling, 
service-oriented architectures, or agile organizations. 
However, if we do not take those contradictions for 
granted, but ask what would be needed to relax or 
overcome them, we could accomplish progress in a 
convincing sense: being able to achieve goals every-
body agreed on without compromising them with 
trade-offs. My experience with designing software 
systems and working on organizational theory sug-
gests that focusing on contradictions like those above 
can be frustrating, but may also inspire us to trans-
cend the frame we used to conceptualize the subject 
of our work. 
 
4.2. Destruction and Liberation 
 
If we accept the presupposition that the world as 
we see it is the reflection of a linguistic construction 
(that does not mean that it would not exist without 
language), change is always accompanied by a 
change of concepts. To give just one example: The 
concepts of enlightenment eventually changed the 
language we use to speak and think about politics. 
But how might a method that guides the design and 
assessment of new concepts look? A moderate ver-
sion of such a method is an inherent part of any seri-
ous scientific study. The concepts that are used to 
describe the phenomenon of an investigation will 
usually undergo a critical analysis aiming to discover 
the likes of ambiguities, inconsistencies, and hidden 
value judgments. After unmasking a concept, it 
would then either be abandoned as an unsuitable 
instrument or replaced by a refined/reconstructed 
version. However, this kind of critical analysis will 
usually happen within a given language paradigm. 
Conceiving of possible futures requires more radical 
procedures, the establishment of which is a tremen-
dous, if not frightening, challenge. Language is a 
pivotal tool for we scientists. We have honed this tool 
through a long process of education and reflection, so 
that it now allows us to recognize things we did not 
see before, and to describe and solve puzzles that we 
were not even aware of in the past. At the same time, 
it delimits our world [26]. Especially, in the case of 
scientists it can be seen as a “web” of our “own crea-
tion” that we are trapped in ([27], p. 199). 
There are various proposals in philosophy advis-
ing how we might free ourselves from this trap. Nie-
tzsche uses the metaphor of a child to illustrate what 
he regards as the ultimate development phase of the 
human spirit, a phase where we get rid of the chains 
created by a language that was imposed on us and 
start to develop our own language: “Innocence the 
child is and forgetting, a beginning anew, a play, a 
self-propelling wheel, a first movement, a sacred 
Yea-saying.” ([28], p. 24). How could we become as 
free as the child in Nietzsche’s allegory? The phase 
that precedes the child is the lion, that is a phase of 
rebellion, of questioning the world and the language 
we were socialized with. Apart from the radical es-
sentialist sense of such an endeavor, it corresponds 
clearly to the critical method that we all know. 
Heidegger tried to develop an ontology that re-
flects the foundational aspects of being. In doing so 
he attempted to overcome those concepts previously 
used to convey ideas of what being is by inventing a 
new vocabulary that served as a tool for uncovering 
formerly hidden aspects of human life and action 
[29]. Derrida suggested an approach he called décon-
struction [30], which, while it could be regarded as a 
method to analyze text by challenging/resolving the 
concepts it is based on, Derrida refused to call a 
method, because method is a key concept of the es-
tablished scientific terminology, which he wanted to 
overcome. To enable the deconstruction of concepts, 
he introduced new concepts. Text represents any form 
of linguistic expression or communicative action. The 
made-up word différance expresses both the obligato-
ry function of semantic differences to enable com-
munication and the impossibility of clearly defining 
differences in meanings. 
What can we learn from philosophers who tried to 
develop new languages? First, they teach us that new 
concepts are likely to alienate others. Reading 
Heidegger or Derrida is painful for most of us and 
will be regarded as annoying and pointless by many. 
Second, trying to overcome the limitations of our 
language is an important prerequisite not only for 
seeing the world through other eyes, but also for 
conceiving of a possible future that is constituted by a 
language yet to emerge. Third, such an undertaking is 
extremely risky, because it means dissolving the floor 
beneath our feet as we walk. Derrida expresses this 
ambivalent effect of deconstruction as follows: “The 
future can only be anticipated in the form of an abso-
lute danger. It is that which breaks absolutely with 
constituted normality and can only be proclaimed, 
presented, as a sort of monstrosity.” ([30], p. 5). 
What does the idea of deconstruction mean for IS 
research? It does not mean recommending the intro-
duction of jargon á la Heidegger or Derrida, and nor 
does it mean systematically destroying the termino-
logical foundation of the discipline. It also does not 
imply systematically replacing the language we use 
to describe and analyze the subject of our research 
with another. Instead, I think of it as a supplement to 
our regular business. In order to develop a critical 
appreciation of the digital transformation, we need to 
focus on the role of language. Doing so involves 
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maintaining a critical stance toward the steady stream 
of new terms and buzzwords that are introduced to 
convey supposed ideas of progress. Instead of adopt-
ing those concepts, we should instead aim to unmask 
them and to develop new concepts that are better 
suited to represent emerging phenomena. Only if we 
cease to regard the concepts underlying spreadsheets, 
operating systems, or accounting systems as given 
can we think of alternative options. Only if we do not 
take the semantics of current modeling and imple-
mentation languages for granted will we be able to 
think of abstractions that might be suited to build 
systems that cope better with conflicting require-
ments, and that are simultaneously better prepared for 
a contingent future. Most of us will regard the con-
cept of a business process as crucial for our field. 
However, if we want to envisage innovative forms of 
collaboration, we probably need to give up this con-
cept or renovate it by deconstructing it. It is needless 
to mention that a discipline that approaches its sub-
ject with a critical, deconstructivist claim will be 
credible only if it develops possible future images of 
its own by challenging and eventually deconstructing 
the concepts the game called IS based upon. 
This kind of critical deconstruction and recon-
struction would not only help to conceive of a future 
that will be constituted by a language yet not known, 
it would broaden our perspective on the current 
world: “All formation of new concepts, all change in 
concepts, involves discovery of the world—that is, 
the development of a new way of looking at the 
world … which may be more or less borne out as 
time goes on. Every theory of formation of new con-
cepts is also about discovering the way the world is.” 
([31], p. 34) 
 
4.3 Justification as a Challenge 
 
Suggesting a conception of theory that comprises 
models and narratives of possible future worlds may 
sound bizarre to some, because it seems to contradict 
the idea of science we are all used to; that however, is 
not my intention. Conceptual models and narratives 
could qualify as theories only if they are regarded as 
sufficiently fulfilling the essential epistemological 
postulates. However, the justification postulate cre-
ates a serious challenge. Abandoning the justification 
postulate would be a frightening option, because it 
would mean sacrificing one of the key achievements 
of modern science, the replacement of ideology and 
force with rationality. 
Scientific inquiry typically asks why something 
(an object, a process, a phenomenon) is. An attempt 
to answer this question would typically be justified 
by showing that it is true for the time being. Concep-
tions of truth [32] are the pivotal criterion for justify-
ing scientific claims. Apparently, a possible world 
cannot be shown to be true in the sense of the corre-
spondence theory of truth, and even less so a new 
language. How might a procedure that serves to justi-
fy appropriateness or desirability look? The justifica-
tion of possible future worlds comprises two main 
aspects: feasibility and attractiveness. Providing a 
satisfactory justification of both aspects would result 
in what we could call scientifically grounded hope. A 
procedure claiming feasibility will normally need to 
satisfactorily answer two questions, the first on 
whether certain aspects of a possible future world 
could be realized, and the second on whether there 
are aspects that are impossible to realize. To give an 
example of the first case: it might be possible to show 
that a conceptual model can be transformed into an 
executable representation. In any case, the transpar-
ency postulate requires making explicit all underlying 
presuppositions that should be true, if a transfor-
mation is possible or impossible. However, not every 
aspect of feasibility is invariant. Skills, attitudes, and 
common practices can change, as can the representa-
tion of information and the world in general. There-
fore, scholars must investigate why the truth value of 
those presuppositions can change over time. In other 
words, they are not necessarily invalid, if it is shown 
that they do not fully apply to a present world. 
While the idea of possible future worlds does by 
no means imply any kind of prescription, it will be 
necessary to evaluate the attractiveness of a possible 
future world to support those who may consider us-
ing it as an orientation. This kind of evaluation re-
quires accounting for possibly unpleasant effects and 
conflicting goals. There is one main way of justifying 
the attractiveness of a possible future world in com-
parison to other alternatives: a discursive approach 
that attempts to account for all relevant aspects and 
for all interests involved. Such a discourse would 
have to be reflective in the sense that it would have to 
include a critical account of values, convictions, and 
of the language of the participants. During the course 
of a discursive evaluation, individual predispositions 
may be subject to change. A related point is that the 
participants would have to cope with having to eval-
uate a future world, which is characterized by a lan-
guage they are not yet familiar with, using the con-
cepts of the present world. The fewer commonalities 
between the two languages, the more likely it is that 
the attempt to develop a satisfactory evaluation of a 
possible future world will fail ([22], p. 9). 
A discursive evaluation may be restricted to a rel-
atively short meeting involving just a few partici-
pants, but it is more likely to happen over a longer 
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period with many different contributions, and it does 
not have to result in a unanimous decision. Organiz-
ing such a process demands rethinking current pat-
terns of academic communication. First, those are 
typically not discourse-centered, but focused on pub-
lications. Second, they exclude those who are not part 
of a specific scientific community. With respect to 
the complexity and relevance of the digital transfor-
mation, it may be more appropriate to widen the 
range of participants to include representatives of 
other disciplines and also people who are not associ-
ated with academic institutions. While I have consid-
erable sympathy with a possible future that is guided 
by the core values of enlightenment, those are cer-
tainly not suited to providing clear guidelines, since 
they are subject to varying interpretations. Rorty 
suggests starting with an apparently small common 
denominator by striving for a future without (avoida-
ble) pain [22]. If we accept this goal for all human 
beings, it implies a sense of empathy and solidarity, 
and finally one is in the middle of the grand political 
discourse of western civilization in general, of the 
political role of science in particular. While one does 
not have to agree with Rorty’s proposal or any other 
vision of a better world, we can hardly tune out the 
discussion about desirable properties of the future 
from the academic discourse. 
 
4.4. The Role of Scientific Culture 
 
The process of justification outlined above in-
cludes various problems. Apparently, the outcome 
will depend on the participants. What abilities and 
attitudes should those people have to qualify? Fur-
thermore, a discourse requires certain rules that need 
to be followed by all participants to prevent a process 
being deemed unsatisfactory. However, those criteria 
and rules must not be defined precisely, because they 
need to be subject to adaptation, too. Therefore, the 
only option that is left that does not sacrifice the 
demand for justification is to emphasize the need for 
a specific, scientific culture. 
The culture of science is mainly characterized by 
critique, freedom, language, and transparency. These 
features cannot be separated from originality, abstrac-
tion, and justification. However, they stress a differ-
ent perspective and additional aspects, which are 
relevant for a suitable conception of science. Critique 
is essential for all schools of philosophy of science. 
Emphasizing the role of critique in scientific culture 
has a number of implications. A critique not only 
requires a skepticism of commonly accepted wisdom 
and research results, it must work on the basis that 
nothing is exempt from criticism—as long as the 
critique is backed by conceivable reason. Hence, a 
critique can be directed against research methods or, 
basic epistemological and ontological assumptions, 
as well as against the language used in a certain dis-
cipline. In order for a critique to be effective, it must 
not only be possible, but also appreciated: a critique 
should not be regarded as a personal attack, but as a 
contribution to the evolution of knowledge. The no-
tion of a critique being a key driver of knowledge 
implies the idea of freedom. Freedom refers to the 
lack of dominion: everyone is free to express his or 
her opinion without the threat of sanction, as long as 
he or she is able to support that opinion with con-
ceivable reason. In an ideal conception of science, 
there is no duress. No viewpoint is preferred over 
another by virtue of the position of those who hold it. 
There is only the “peculiarly forceless force of the 
better argument” (translated from [33], p. 52). 
 
5. Examples 
 
What does that mean for the concept of theory in 
IS? It suggests we would be wise not to restrict our 
view to the factual world. We should not look only at 
existing technologies and related patterns of use but 
should adopt a broader perspective based on the 
recognition that the construction of action systems 
and information systems is contingent in the sense 
that it could result in many different outcomes. 
Therefore, we should try to look beyond the facts that 
happen to form reality. In a more radical sense, this 
kind of outlook involves challenging apparently self-
evident and commonly accepted concepts. The fol-
lowing three examples serve to illustrate how theoret-
ical contributions of this kind might look. 
The development of reusable and adaptable con-
ceptual models requires the selection of a modeling 
language. GPMLs can be reused in a wide range of 
cases. However, their support for the efficient design 
of models is poor, because they are restricted to basic 
concepts such as class, process, and attribute. 
DSMLs, on the other hand, improve productivity by 
providing modelers with domain-specific concepts 
such as goal, and organizational unit, but their range 
of reuse is limited. The approach presented in [34] 
shows that this conflict can be mitigated, if the lan-
guage paradigm is changed. The work proposes a 
new language architecture that follows the idea of 
multilevel languages, that is, languages which allow 
for an arbitrary number of (meta) classifications. The 
language architecture is specified through a recursive 
meta-metamodel and can be instantiated to multiple 
domain-specific models. It not only allows the bene-
fits of productivity and economies of scale to be 
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combined, but also enables a new kind of information 
system that empowers users to modify a system on a 
conceptual level. This is achieved through a common 
representation of models and code, which in turn is 
enabled through a paradigmatic shift from traditional 
language architectures. Accordingly, the underlying 
language technology, which comprises a (meta) pro-
gramming and modeling environment [35], is used in 
academic research exclusively, which makes empiri-
cal tests in the field almost impossible. The approach 
is evaluated by showing that the conflicts between 
undisputed goals can clearly be reduced. 
Lanier develops a critical account of the current 
internet economy [36]. For this purpose, he identifies 
contradictions and related “absurdities” (Ibid., p. 19). 
He supplements his critique with two kinds of narra-
tives. First, he uses narratives to illustrate possible 
excesses of the current trends. For example, he de-
scribes scenarios of new markets for customized 
drugs by using fiction to supplement his analysis of 
the technological and economic background. Second, 
he proposes a vision of what he calls “humanistic 
economics”, which at its core is based on a new con-
ception and implementation of the internet that pro-
motes “network neutrality”. It is aimed at overcom-
ing “useless concentrations of wealth and power” 
(Ibid., p. 287). Like Lanier’s work, van Reybrouck’s 
book on possible future models of democracy is not 
only intended to contribute to academic debate, but 
targets a broader audience [37]. Even though it con-
cerns a different discipline, namely political science, 
it may serve as an example of how to use narratives 
to address political aspects of change through the 
digital transformation. By illustrating contradictions 
(“paradoxa”) produced by established forms of de-
mocracy, he concludes that if the principle ideas of 
democracy are to be preserved, it is necessary to 
overcome aspects of democratic institutions that we 
tend to take for granted. He starts with a critical ac-
count of the current situation that involves the discus-
sion of empirical investigations and apparent phe-
nomena, such as the problems of legitimacy and 
efficiency “western democracies are struggling with” 
(Ibid., p. 6). After an analysis of the causes of this 
unpleasant situation, he presents a new concept of 
democracy, which he calls “allotted assemblies”. At 
its core, the notion suggests transferring certain polit-
ical decisions from elected parliaments to councils 
and panels of citizens chosen by lot. Van Reybrouck 
offers two justifications for this proposal. First, he 
explains why assemblies might be suited to redress 
problems with the current models of democracy. 
Second, he refers to similar ideas by other authors as 
offering a precedent. He is aware of the fact that a 
suggestion that seems radical, if not bizarre to many, 
could not be implemented tomorrow. By pointing at 
examples from the past such as giving women the 
right to vote, he argues that “thinking further ahead” 
(Ibid., p. 131) can promote valuable change. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The neo-positivistic notion of theory has proven 
an extremely powerful construction. However, this is 
only the case when certain preconditions are fulfilled. 
Ignoring the preconditions and keeping the legend of 
“theory is king” alive would be unfortunate, because 
it promotes schematic scientific work and trivial 
results. 
The conception of theory presented in this paper 
is intended to outline a possible alternative, not only 
for constructing and representing ideas, but also for 
organizing the process of academic inquiry. It ac-
counts for general philosophical considerations and 
the peculiarities of the digital transformation as a 
pivotal research subject of IS. It corresponds to the 
original conception of theory (“looking beyond”) and 
is in line with essential ideas of science. Neverthe-
less, some of the suggestions I made may be per-
ceived as radical. There are certainly good reasons to 
challenge them, as there are good reasons to doubt 
the feasibility of satisfactory justification procedures. 
Furthermore, some might consider the reference to 
post-modernist philosophy beside the point. Howev-
er, there is no doubt that research which is aimed at 
understanding the drivers of the digital transfor-
mation needs to account for the pivotal role of lan-
guage. Furthermore, a discipline that desires to be 
more than a bystander or a follower (I am afraid that 
has largely been the case for the discipline in the 
past), needs to develop methods to conceive of possi-
ble future worlds and to make them a subject of in-
spiring discourses. Supplementing truth with justified 
hope for a better world [38] could be suited as a 
sense-making orientation for this kind of research. 
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